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SINCE 1973, when the price of oil was raised very sharply,  developing 
countries  have incurred  heavy debts. This paper  looks at their ability  to 
carry  debt,  first  by examining  the balance  of payments  and external  bor- 
rowing  of all developing  countries  that are  not oil producers  in general.  It 
then focuses on a group of ten advanced  developing  countries  that ac- 
count for the bulk of the borrowing  from private  sources  that has given 
rise  to widely  expressed  concern. 
The analysis  that follows leads to an optimistic  conclusion  about  the 
capacity  of the ten countries  not only to carry  their present  debt but to 
expand it. It does not follow that decisionmakers  in private financial 
markets  will come to the same  conclusion.  Thus  attention  is given also to 
supplementing  private lending with resources  supplied  by the Interna- 
tional Monetary  Fund. Furthermore,  questions are raised about what 
could go wrong-what international  developments  could make the out- 
look less rosy  for the heavy  debtors. 
The Enlargement  of Current  Surpluses  and Deficits  since 1973 
The current-account  surplus  for countries  of the Organization  of Petro- 
leum Exporting  Countries  and the corresponding  deficit  of oil-importing 
countries  is being financed  in large part  by the creation  of international 
debt. The OPEC surplus  (on goods, services,  and private  transfers,  the 
Note: I am grateful to George Henry, Goran Ohlin, Edwin Truman, the two dis- 
cussants, and the editors for helpful suggestions  on earlier versions of this paper. 
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concept  used  throughout  this  paper) increased  from $6 billion  in 1973 to 
$67 billion  in 1974;  it fell to $35 billion  during  the recession  of 1975, rose 
again  to $41 billion  in 1976, and  is expected  to fall only slightly  in 1977.1 
The  members  of OPEC  have  been  unable  to sustain  the rapid  increases 
in imports  of 1974 and 1975. Whereas  the dollar  value of OPEC  imports 
rose about  64 percent  in 1974 and 65 percent  in 1975, the increase  was 
only 24 percent  in 1976, according  to data from  the International  Mone- 
tary  Fund.  As is well known,  the OPEC  members  with the largest  output 
and  largest  oil reserves-those on the Arabian  peninsula-have a limited 
capacity  to absorb  increased  imports.  However,  as other  OPEC  members 
move into current-account  deficit,  the aggregate  surplus  of OPEC will 
decline  even if Saudi  Arabia  and  its immediate  neighbors  continue  to run 
large  surpluses.  Just  when  the OPEC  surplus  will disappear  and  give way 
to deficit  is uncertain.  For the purposes  of this  paper  it is assumed  that  the 
surplus  will persist,  probably  on a declining  scale, for a number  of years. 
Consequently,  the process  of international  debt creation  will also go on 
for some time.  As long as the imports  of OPEC  members  as a group  fall 
short  of their  export  proceeds,  a corresponding  deficit  must  be incurred  by 
the rest of the world.  Unless they are directed  at cutting  oil consumption 
without  depressing  total output,  efforts  to depress  this deficit  will tend to 
reduce  the aggregate  demand  either  of the countries  making  the effort  or 
of their  trading  partners. 
Conceivably,  these surpluses  and deficits could be financed  without 
debt  creation.  The OPEC  and  other  surplus  countries  could  acquire  direct 
investments  or equities  in the deficit  countries;  or the IMF could issue 
special drawing  rights  in a volume large enough  to permit  the financing 
of deficits  by countries  that  would  otherwise  exhaust  their  reserves  if they 
did  not borrow;  or the countries  in surplus  could  make  grants  to the coun- 
tries  in deficit.  In fact,  OPEC  and  other  surplus  countries  have  made  some 
direct investment  and purchased  equities since 1973. And the OPEC 
group has provided  some grants-mainly to military  allies-while  the 
industrial  countries  have  continued  to make  development  assistance  avail- 
able partly  on a grant  basis.  To a major  extent,  however,  the imbalances 
have  been  financed  by borrowing  on the part  of countries  in deficit  and  by 
the acquisition  of securities  and  bank  deposits  on the part  of countries  in 
surplus. 
1. International  Monetary Fund, Annual Report of the Executive Directors for 
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It is also conceivable  that  the countries  in surplus,  while accumulating 
repayable  claims,  would  lend directly  to countries  in deficit.  If this prac- 
tice were followed, the intermediary  role of banks  would be eliminated 
and,  with  it, the concern  that  has arisen  about  the ability  of banks  to con- 
tinue  this  role. But, it seems  clear,  the countries  in surplus  have  preferred 
to place  most  of their  growing  claims  on the rest  of the world  in what  they 
regard  as secure and relatively  liquid financial  assets: U.S. government 
securities,  other  official  and  private  securities  in developed  countries,  and 
bank  deposits.  Countries  in deficit,  in turn,  have  issued  securities  in these 
markets  and  have  borrowed  from  these  banks. 
Under  the circumstances,  questions  have arisen  about  the debt burden 
that is  accumulating,  especially on the part of  developing countries. 
Though  less subject  to publicity,  many-in  fact most-industrial coun- 
tries have also been heavy borrowers.  Only a few industrial  countries- 
West Germany,  Japan,  the Netherlands,  and Switzerland-have current 
surpluses;  but they are sizable,  totaling  almost  $17 billion  in 1976. As a 
result, the rest of the world has incurred  a current  deficit  equal to the 
OPEC surplus  plus the surplus  of these few countries.  As noted, a large 
part  of that  deficit  has been financed  by borrowing.  Net external  borrow- 
ing by nonoil developing  countries  in 1974 and 1975 financed  about  70 
percent  of their combined  current-account  deficit.  In 1976, these coun- 
tries borrowed  an amount  greater  than their current-account  deficit  and 
added substantially  to their reserves.  In the three-year  period,  about 80 
percent of the borrowings  were on a long-term  basis, about half from 
official  sources  and  half from  private  sources.  Short-term  borrowing  (less 
than one-year maturity) from private creditors,  at about $5 billion in 
1974-75, accounted  for about  one-fifth  of total borrowing.2  Of the total 
debt of nonoil  developing  countries  outstanding  at the end of 1976 ($140 
billion), all but about  $20 billion was either  borrowed  by official  entities 
or officially  guaranteed.3 
This process  is likely to continue  and it is easy to demonstrate  that as 
long as OPEC  members  in the aggregate  remain  in surplus,  funds  will be 
available  from the proceeds  of that surplus  to finance  the deficits  of oil- 
importing  countries  in the aggregate.  The OPEC surplus  provides the 
means  for its own  financing.4 
2.  Ibid.,p. 21. 
3. World Bank, World  Debt Tables, vol. 1 (September  2, 1977), p. 47. 
4.  Robert Solomon, The International Monetary System, 1945-1976:  An  In- 
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Table 1. Growth  of Output,  Trade,  and  Debt, Nonoil Developing  Countries,  Pre-1973 
and 1973-76 
Percent 
Growth  item  Pre-1973  1973  1974  1975  1976 
Real GNP  6.1A  6.7  5.2  3.4  5.1 
Exports  6.5b  8.0  4.5  0.0  13.0 
Imports  5.5b  15.0  8.0  -6.0  1.5 
External  public  and publicly 
guaranteed  debt (in 1970 prices)  9.8%  -11.4  -10.7  25.4  8.1 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, Annual Report of  the Executive Directors  for  the Fiscal  Year 
Ended  April 30, 1977, pp. 7, 9, except the last row, which is computed from row 10, table 2, below. 
a.  Compound annual rate of growth, 1967-72. 
b. Compound annual rate of growth, 1962-72. 
Such  aggregative  analysis  leaves  many  observers  uneasy.  Isn't  it pos- 
sible,  they  ask,  that  the  growing  debt  of  some  countries  will  threaten  to 
become  unmanageable  (a  concept  to  be  examined  below)  and  that 
lenders-those  who  are intermediating  between  the OPEC  and other  sur- 
plus  countries  on  the  one  hand  and  the  large  number  of deficit  countries 
on  the  other-will  stop  lending  or  be  left  with  bad  debts?  This  type  of 
question  tends  to  focus  on  those  nonoil  developing  countries  that  have 
been  borrowing  heavily  from banks. 
The  sizable  increase  in debt  by developing  countries  in recent  years  is 
a more  complex  matter  than  the  financing  of  the  OPEC  surplus  and  the 
corresponding  "oil  deficits"  of  oil-importing  countries.  As  noted  above, 
the nonoil  developing  countries  increased  their reserves  in  1976,  and they 
did  so  by  more  than  they  increased  their  debt  to  private  creditors.  Fur- 
thermore,  their  enlarged  deficits  have  resulted  not  only  from  the increase 
in oil prices  but also from the impact  of the recession  and subsequent  slow 
recovery  in industrial  countries.  Real  output  in the industrial  nations  was 
unchanged  in  1974  and fell  1 percent  in  1975,  while  in nonoil  developing 
countries  output  increased  5.2  percent  in  1974  and  3.4  percent  in  1975 
(see  table  1). 
As  a result  of  these  and  other  influences,  the  current  deficit  of  nonoil 
developing  countries  increased  from  $11  billion  in  1973,  to  $30  billion 
in  1974,  and  to  $38  billion  in  1975;  in  1976,  the  deficit  declined  to  $26 
billion  and it is estimated  at about  the same  level  in 1977  (see  table  2). 
These  deficits  of nonoil  developing  countries  rose  in  1975  as the result 
of  the  recession  in  industrial  countries.  But  the  increase  from  1973  to 
1976  seems  to be explainable  entirely  by the rise of oil prices. tp  i  n  a  0  ^. . 
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As shown in table 2, the value of merchandise  imports  to all nonoil 
developing  countries  from  OPEC  members  increased  from  $8.1 billion  in 
1973 to $22.8 billion in 1975. Their exports  to OPEC increased  from 
$2.3 billion  to $6.4 billion.  Thus  their  trade  deficit  with  OPEC  grew  from 
$5.8 billion in 1973 to $16.4 billion in 1975 and accounted  for 47 per- 
cent of the increase  in their  total trade  deficit  in this period.  In 1976, the 
trade  deficit  of these developing  countries  with OPEC, at $19.8 billion, 
was larger  than their total trade deficit.  The growth  in the trade  deficit 
with  OPEC  from 1973 to 1976 ($14 billion) exceeded  the increase  in the 
total trade  deficit  of nonoil developing  countries  ($9 billion). Trade  with 
OPEC  countries  includes  more than oil, so that these results  do not give 
a precise  measure  of the impact  of the change  in oil prices and oil con- 
sumption  on trade  balances;  but it comes fairly close. (Even for one of 
the more developed  and diversified  OPEC countries,  Venezuela,  petro- 
leum  accounted  for 94 percent  of total  exports  in 1976.) 
Faster recovery  in the industrial  countries  could bring  a further  nar- 
rowing  of the deficit of nonoil developing  countries.  But some of these 
countries  have  imposed  stringent  restrictions  on a broad  range  of imports, 
and these might  be relaxed  as export  proceeds  increase.  It is noteworthy 
that the volume of total imports  into nonoil developing  countries  was 6 
percent  lower in 1975 than in 1974, despite  the continued,  though  less 
than  historical,  real  growth  of their  economies. 
The notion  that  deficits  of nonoil  developing  countries  are abnormally 
enlarged  is contradicted  by an analysis of the International  Monetary 
Fund that  scales up these deficits  for world  inflation  and  real growth.  On 
this basis, the average  current-account  deficit  of $8.1 billion per year in 
1967-72 becomes  the equivalent  of $27 billion  in 1977 prices  and  levels 
of real output.  It so happens  that  this is precisely  equal  to the fund's  pro- 
jection  of the aggregate  current-account  deficit  of nonoil  developing  coun- 
tries  in 1977.5 
The conclusion  drawn  from the fund analysis  is that the nonoil devel- 
oping  countries  are absorbing  resources  in real terms  from  the rest  of the 
world at about  the same  relative  rate as before  the OPEC  price  rise. The 
big change is that now the OPEC countries  rather  than the industrial 
countries  have the corresponding  surpluses.  For purposes  of this paper, 
the IMF analysis  is reasonable  in broad terms, and the paper  therefore 
assumes  that  nonoil  developing  countries  as a group  should  and  will con- 
tinue  to incur  substantial  current-account  deficits  in the years  ahead. 
5. IMF Survey, vol. 6 (May 16, 1977), p. 149. Robert  Solomon  485 
The question  is whether  or not the debt being incurred  by nonoil de- 
veloping  countries  is manageable. 
Growth  and Manageability  of Debt 
The literature  on debt-financed  economic development  pictures the 
process  as a race  between  two variables  growing  at compound  rates:  debt 
and income.6  Debt is generated  by the gap between  domestic  saving  and 
investment,  which can increase  in absolute  terms  over time. As the gap 
widens  and  debt cumulates,  interest  charges  also cumulate,  and the coun- 
try must borrow  increasing  amounts  just to maintain  a constant  flow of 
net imports.  It must also borrow  to refinance  maturing  debt obligations. 
Income,  in turn,  grows  as a result  of the investment  process.  The capacity 
to service  debt depends  fundamentally  on the continuing  growth  of out- 
put, which makes  it feasible  ultimately  to close and then reverse  the gap 
between  domestic  saving  and  investment. 
The process can be depicted  by a simplified  model adapted  from the 
difference-equation  model  presented  by Avramovic  and  his associates.7  In 
the model below, growth  proceeds  as the result  of increasing  investment 
and a fixed  incremental  capital-output  ratio.  All external  debt  is assumed 
to finance  the gap between  investment  and domestic  saving;  changes  in 
reserves  and capital  inflows  other than interest-bearing  debt are ignored 
and all prices are assumed  to be constant.  Amortization  of past loans is 
also ignored  on the plausible  assumption  that, as long as the gap exists, 
scheduled  loan repayments  will be offset by new borrowings.  Thus debt 
accumulates  as the result  of the gap between  investment  and saving  and 
of the  interest  on the growing  debt. 
Investment  and  saving  are  related  to income  as follows: 
I(n)  =  krY(n) =  krYoern; 
S(n)  =  sY(n)  =  sYoern, 
where  I and  S are investment  and saving  net of depreciation,  Y is net na- 
tional  product,  k is the incremental  capital-output  ratio,  r is the growth  of 
6.  See especially Dragoslav Avramovic and others, Economic Growth and Ex- 
ternal Debt (Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), and Goran Ohlin, Aid and Indebtedness: 
The Relation Between Aid Requirements,  Terms of Assistance and Indebtedness  of 
Developing Countries (Paris: Development Centre of  the Organisation for Eco- 
nomic Co-operation  and Development, 1966). These analyses are carried out on the 
assumption  of stable world prices, an assumption  relaxed  below. 
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real and nominal  net national  product  and income, s is the ratio of do- 
mestic  saving  to net national  income,  n represents  time, and  the subscript 
zero  denotes  the  year  before  debt  began  to be incurred. 
Then debt outstanding,  D, at time T is the sum of loans taken  up to 
finance  the gap between  investment  and domestic  saving  from the time 
the process  began,  together  with  the accumulation  of interest,  i, at a com- 
pound  rate  on each of these loans from  the time at which  it was incurred 
totimeT: 
T 
D(T) =  (I(n) -  S(n))ei(T-n)  dn 
rT 
(krYoern  -  sYoern)ei(T-n)  dn 
(kr -  s)YoeiT je(Ti)n  dn, for r  F  i. 
Therefore, 
(1)  D(T)  =  kr  -  s 
YO(erT  -  eiT),  r  5  i.  r -  i 
The ratio of debt to income  is 
-(T)  I.  kr  1  Y  Yo(eT-  -  eir)  =  kr-s  (1 -  eT(iU) 
Y(T)  YoeT \r  -/  r-  i 
Lim D(T)  _  icr  -  fSif>  i 
T-D.o Y(T)  r-  i 
Thus if the rate of growth  of output  exceeds  the rate  of interest  on ex- 
ternal  borrowing,  the debt-income  ratio  levels off ultimately  at (kr -- s) / 
(r-  i). 
The condition  for the debt-income  ratio to reach a maximum  may be 
derived: 
d  (T) 
(3)  Y(T) -  ir  - 
[-(i-r)eT(i-r)]  =  (kr  -  s)eT(i-r) 
dT  r-i 
Setting  this  expression  equal  to zero, 
(kr -  s)eT(i-7)  =  kr  -  s  =  O. 
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It is clear from equation 3 that the second derivative  is negative  if 
r >  i. The debt-income ratio is thus asymptotic to (kr -  s) /(r  -  i)  since 
the  maximum  is reached  only  when  T is at infinity. 
Thus with an unchanged (kr  -  s) / (r -  i),  the rate of growth of the 
debt-income  ratio will decelerate  over time as long as r > i, an essential 
condition.  Debt accumulation  need  not be an explosive  process.  The ques- 
tion  may  still  be asked  whether  the limit  is a reasonable  one in terms  of the 
ability  of the borrowing  country  to service  debt.  I return  to this question 
below. 
If, more  realistically,  one allows  for changes  over  time  in kr and  s, it is 
the closing of the gap between them-that  is, between  investment  and 
domestic saving-that  ends the process of net debt accumulation.  The 
evolution  of countries,  including  the United States  in the late nineteenth 
century,  from net capital  importers  to net capital  exporters  was presum- 
ably the result  of such changes  in the parameters  that are treated  as con- 
stants  in the abstract  model. 
If world  inflation  is taken  into account,  the story  changes  somewhat.  A 
steady  rate of inflation  from  the beginning  of the debt-accumulation  pro- 
cess would, of course,  lead to higher  debt  in nominal  terms.  In equations 
1 and 2, the appropriate  value of r would  include  the rate of increase  of 
world prices (expressed  in dollars or SDRs) added to the real growth 
rate. If this inflation  is just fully reflected  in the interest  rate, i, both the 
nominal  value of debt and the debt-income  ratio would be higher  than 
under  stable prices.  The less the inflation  rate is reflected  in the interest 
rate,  the  lower  the limit  of debt  to income. 
What  must be analyzed  is the effect of the acceleration  of inflation  in 
1972-73. A number  of impacts  on debt may be identified.  Nominal  new 
borrowings  had to increase  merely  to finance  an unchanged  real gap be- 
tween investment  and domestic saving, but this increase was roughly 
proportional  to the increase  in national  product  that  resulted  from  higher 
prices.  On the other  hand,  borrowings  to refinance  maturing  debt  declined 
relative  to national  product  and the current  gap. Nominal  interest  rates 
on new debt,  to finance  the gap and to replace  maturing  debt,  rose by an 
inflation  premium  and thus enlarged  the amount  of subsequent  new bor- 
rowing  that  was required;  but  interest  rates  on the borrowings  by develop- 
ing countries  rose by less than  the increase  in the inflation  rate, since the 
latter  was generally  expected  to subside.  Thus the greater  the proportion 
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country  had incurred  before the inflation  began-inflation that was un- 
anticipated  and  therefore  not reflected  in interest  rates  before 1972-73- 
the  more  it stood  to gain. 
It seems  clear  that  the net effect  of the unanticipated  inflation  has been 
to lighten  the burden  of debt. Even though  the nonoil developing  coun- 
tries  suffered  a deterioration  in their  terms  of trade,  as did all oil-import- 
ing countries,  the increase  in world  prices  reduced  the real value of out- 
standing  debt in 1973-74, as shown in table 2, where the deflator  is an 
index of the export  prices  of developing  countries,  excluding  petroleum. 
Even when deflated  debt did not fall, it rose less in real than in nominal 
terms. 
Major  Borrowers  from  Banks  among  Developing  Countries 
The ten more advanced  nonoil developing  countries  that account  for 
the bulk of recent external  borrowing  from private  sources  represented 
44 percent of the current  deficits  of all nonoil developing  countries  in 
1976 (see table 3).  From 1973 to 1976, they were responsible  for 61 
percent  of the increase in the aggregate  deficit  of nonoil developing  coun- 
tries. Furthermore,  among the ten countries,  Brazil and Mexico loom 
large  in most  years. 
These ten countries  owe a large proportion  of the developing  coun- 
tries'  debt to private  creditors.  Table 4 shows that, of the total debt to 
banks of nonoil developing  countries  (including  short-term  debt, which 
is excluded  from  the debt  totals  in table 2), the ten countries  owe almost 
three-fourths,  and Brazil and Mexico alone almost half. Bank debt in 
turn  is the major  form  of debt from  private  sources.  These  countries  have 
issued  a relatively  small  amount  of securities  in foreign  markets. 
The more  advanced  developing  countries  were  already  borrowing  from 
private  lenders  before  the sharp  increase  in their  current-account  deficits 
in 1974. A number  of them-notably,  Brazil and Mexico-had  estab- 
lished their access to the Eurocurrency  markets  and other banks in the 
late 1960s and  early  1970s. 
Borrowing  from private  sources  accelerated  after 1973. The external 
debt of forty-six  middle-income  nonoil developing  countries  to private 
creditors  increased  from $34 billion  at the end of 1973 to almost  $69 bil- Robert  Solomon  489 
Table 3. Current-Account  Deficits, Ten Advanced  and  All Nonoil Developing 
Countries,  Selected  Years 1968 76A 
Millions of dollars  except where  noted 
Country  1968  1970  1973  1974  1975  1976 
Argentina  47  156  -704  -125  1,281  -617 
Brazil  543  569  1,764  7,178  6,744  6,212 
Chile  141  95  289  186  578  -25 
Colombia  188  330  78  382  126  -320 
Mexico  744  1,083  1,423  2,890  4,210  3,417 
Peru  53  -146  299  751  1,574  1,231 
Philippines  294  69  -439  241  990  1,142 
South Korea  561  706  343  2,094  1,955  325 
Taiwan  117  -7  -570  1,113  580  -395 
Thailand  207  0  -130  -54  503  486 
Subtotal  2,895  2,855  2,353  14,656  18,541  11,456 
Subtotal  as pro- 
portion of 
total  0.43  0.33  0.22  0.50  0.49  0.44 
Total, all nonoil 
developing 
countries  6,800  8,700  10,900  29,500  38,200  25,800 
Sources: Country data, IMF,  International  Financial Statistics, vol.  29  (August  1976), vol.  30 (Sep- 
tember 1977); total, row 5, table 2, above; and IMF, Annual  Report, 1976, p. 20. 
a.  Goods, services, and private transfers; minus sign denotes surplus. 
lion  at the  end  of  1976.  For  these  countries,  total  debt  in relation  to  ex- 
ports  of  goods  and  services  increased  from  77  percent  in  1967  to  105 
percent  in 1976.8 
The  changes  from  1967  to  1975  in  the  ratio  of  external  public  and 
publicly  guaranteed  debt  to  gross  national  product  and  to  exports  are 
shown  in table  5 for the ten major borrowers. 
Except  for  Chile,  Peru,  and  Mexico,  the  ratios  of  debt  to  exports  de- 
creased,  increased  moderately,  or  remained  relatively  low  (Philippines) 
from  1967  to  1975.  I shall  consider  the  ratios  to GNP  below. 
The  debt-service  ratio-annual  interest  plus  amortization  relative  to 
exports-is  often  used  as a measure  of creditworthiness.  But it is a defec- 
tive  measure,  as Avramovic  and his colleagues  point  out,9 principally  be- 
cause  maturities  are  bunched.  Thus,  for  example,  almost  60  percent  of 
Brazil's  public  and  publicly  guaranteed  debt  outstanding  at  the  end  of 
8. These data were supplied  by the World Bank. 
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Table  4. External  Bank  Debt and Increase  of Reserves,  Ten Advanced  and All Nonoil 
Developing  Countries,  1975 and 1976 
Billions  of dollars 
Increase  of 
Bank debta  reserves 
Country  1975  1976  1976 
Argentina  3.2  3.4  1.2 
Brazil  14.8  21.2  2.5 
Chile  0.8  1.1  0.3 
Colombia  1.6  1.6  0.6 
Mexico  13.5  17.9  n.a. 
Peru  2.3  2.8  -0.1 
Philippines  2.0  2.6  0.3 
South Korea  3.3  3.9  1.4 
Taiwan  2.1  2.6  0. 4 
Thailand  1.2  1.4  0.1 
Subtotal  44.8  58.5  6.7 
Subtotal  as proportion  of total  0.71  0.72  0.58 
Total, all nonoil developing 
countries  63.0  80.9  11.6 
Sources: Bank debt-Bank  for International Settlements, Forth-Sixth Annual Report: 1st April 1975- 
31st March  1976, pp. 86-87, 1977, pp. 112-14 (includes debt witlh  maturity of one year and less); reserves- 
IMF, International  Financial Statistics, vol. 30 (September 1977), p. 25, converted from special drawing 
rights. 
a.  End of year. 
n.a.  Not available. 
1974 was repayable  over the following five years. For most of the ten 
countries, a large proportion  of debt outstanding  to private creditors 
comes to final maturity  in the next five years.10 
There  will thus be need for rollovers  or for new loans to replace  ma- 
turing  loans. This is hardly  a novel predicament  for bankers.  If the basic 
economic  prospects  for the debtors  are  satisfactory-a question  examined 
below-the  bunching  of maturities  represents  a short-run  liquidity  prob- 
lem, not a fundamental  inability  to carry  debt. 
In some cases, high debt-service  ratios may not require  formal  debt 
refinancing,  for private  capital  will be attracted  by satisfactory  economic 
performance.  Such  was the experience  of Japan  in the early 1960s and  of 
Mexico  in the mid-1960s."' 
10. World Bank, World Debt Tables, vol. 1 (September  2, 1977), p. 210. 
11. Reed J. Irvine, Yves Maroni, and Henry F. Lee, "How to Borrow Success- 
fully," Columbia Journal of World Business, vol. 5 (January-February 1970), pp. 
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Table  5. Ratio of External  Public  and Publicly  Guaranteed  Debt to GNP and  to 
Exports  of Goods  and  Nonfactor  Services,  Ten Advanced  Nonoil 
Developing  Countries,  1967 and 1975 
Ratio 
Debt to GNP  Debt to exports 
Country  1967  1975  1967  1975 
Argentinas  0.11  0.08  1.04  0.84 
Brazil  0.08  0.12  1.43  1.24 
Chile  0.19  0.44  1.22  2.14 
Colombia  0.14  0.18  1.15  1.22 
Mexico%  0.09  0.15  1.01  1.89 
Peru  0.13  0.21  0.72  1.52 
Philippinesa  0.03  0.08  0.19  0.41 
South Korea  0.13  0.28  1.00  0.90 
Taiwan  0.08  0.12  0.36  0.28 
Thailanda  0.05  0.04  0.25  0.22 
Sources: Data from the World Bank, except 1975 ratios for Chile, which are computed from World  Debt 
Tables, vol. 2 (September 2,  1977), World  Bank Atlas: Population,  Per Capita Product, and Growth  Rates 
(World Bank, 1976), and IMF, International  Financial  Statistics, vol. 30 (September 1977). 
a.  Total debt is substantially higher than public and publicly guaranteed debt. 
Whether or not private lenders will be willing and able to refinance 
maturing debt while continuing to increase outstanding debt as required 
to finance deficits is not predictable. If the improved current-account po- 
sitions of 1976 are maintained, the amount of net new bank loans needed 
by nonoil developing countries will be rather small. Even so, some of the 
banks that have been heavy lenders may feel incapable of increasing their 
exposure, or may choose not to do so even if they can. To throw light on 
this question would require a separate study. But the banks' eagerness to 
expand their lending will continue to depend on the underlying economic 
performance of the debtor countries. 
The Economic Performance 
of the Advanced Nonoil Developing Countries 
This section examines first the broad indicators of economic  perfor- 
mance of the ten advanced developing countries in recent years. It then at- 
tempts to  assign plausible values to the parameters of  the growth-debt 
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Table  6. Growth  Rates, Ten Advanced  Nonoil Developing  Countries, 
Selected Periods, 1960-751 
Percent  per year 
Country  1960-70  1970-73  1973-75b 
Argentina  4.4  3.8  2.7 
Brazil  6. 2o  11.4  6.8 
Chile  4.9  1.2  -4.8 
Colombia  5.2  6.9  5.3 
Mexico  7.0  6.1  5.1 
Peru  5.5  5.7  5.2 
Philippines  5.4  6.8  6.0 
South Korea  8.7  11.1  10.7 
Taiwan  9.0  11.8  4.8 
Thailand  7.9  7.5  5.5 
Sources: Computed from country data in IMF,  International  Financial Statistics, vol.  30 (May  1977 
and September 1977). 
a.  Compound annual rates of growth of gross domestic product at 1970 prices. 
b.  1973-76 for Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
c.  1963-70. 
the ratio of debt to income. Finally, it explores  whether  the service on 
the debt  at the  limit  would  be an  unbearable  burden. 
Real growth  rates for the ten countries  are shown in table 6. Except 
for Argentina,  even in the 1960s their  growth  rates  were higher  than the 
average  of industrial  countries.  Five of the ten showed a significant  ac- 
celeration  in output  growth  in 1970-73. In 1974-75, output  was affected 
by the rise of oil prices and the recession  in industrial  countries  but, as 
noted earlier,  developing  countries  were more successful  than industrial 
countries  in maintaining  economic  expansion.  In 1973-75-or,  where  the 
data  are  available,  1973-76-growth  rates  exceeded  5 percent,  except  for 
Argentina,  Chile, and Taiwan. (In the last the growth  rate averaged  4.8 
percent during 1973-76,  but from the fourth quarter  of  1975 to the 
fourth  quarter  of 1976 industrial  production  increased  20 percent.) 
Meanwhile,  real interest  rates on external  debt were quite low. Ac- 
cording  to the World Bank, interest  paid on external  public debt out- 
standing  was 4.6, 5.2, and 5.5 percent,  respectively,  in the three years 
1973-75 for all developing  countries.  On debt to private  creditors,  the 
rates  were 7.0, 8.6, and 8.4 percent,  respectively,  for the three  years.'2  If 
the rate of world  inflation,  in terms  of dollars,  is approximated  at 7 per- 
cent, real interest  rates on debt to private  creditors  could not be said to 
exceed 1 percent. 
12. World Bank, World Debt Tables, vol. 1 (September  2, 1977), p. 39. Robert  Solomon  493 
Table 7. Indexes  of Volume  of Exports,  Selected  Nonoil Developing  Countries, 
1973-76 
1970  =  100 
Country  1973  1974  1975  1976 
Brazila  173  195  203  206 
Peru  72  72  66  67 
Philippines  145  111  132  177 
South Korea  305  333  410  557 
Taiwan  221  211  209  322 
Thailand  139  152  147  199 
Source: IMF, International  Financial Statistics, vol. 30 (September 1977), country pages. 
a.  Excluding coffee; including coffee, the volume indexes are 155, 158, 165, 167. Coffee constituted 20 
percent of the value of exports in 1973 and 21 percent in 1976. 
Data on the volume  of total  exports  are  available  for only six of the ten 
countries.  They are shown  in table 7 for 1973-76 on a base of 1970 = 
100. In some cases,  notably  South  Korea  and  Taiwan,  the performance  is 
phenomenal.  Except for Peru, which was affected  by recession-induced 
decreases  in demand  for mineral  products  in industrial  countries  and by 
the fall in the fishmeal  catch,  the countries  for which  a measure  of export 
volume is available  outperformed  most industrial  countries  by a con- 
siderable  margin.  In Japan,  probably  the industrial  country  with  the larg- 
est export expansion,  the volume of exports  almost  doubled  from 1970 
to 1976; for Germany,  exports  increased  53 percent  and for the United 
States,  48 percent. 
In assigning  values  to the  parameters  of the limit  of debt  to net  national 
product, (kr -  s) / (r -  i),  the major problem is that estimates of saving 
rates  derived  independently  of investment  rates  are  not available.  The al- 
ternative  is an attempt  to measure  directly  kr -  s, the gap between  net 
investment  and  net saving  as a proportion  of net national  product. 
I measure  the  gap  by subtracting  net  payments  of interest  and  dividends 
from the deficit  on goods and services.  The resulting  figure  should  repre- 
sent the absorption  into domestic  use of goods and services  from  abroad. 
When  divided  by net national  product,  it provides  an estimate  of kr -  s. 
The year 1974 is chosen for the calculations  because national-accounts 
data  are not available  for 1976 for many  countries  and  because,  in 1975, 
the trade deficits  of developing  countries  were temporarily  enlarged  by 
the world  recession.  The results  are  presented  in table 8. The gap shown 
m column 1 is larger  than it appears  it will be for 1976, given that the 
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Table 8. Calculation  of Gap between  Investment  and  Saving  as a Proportion  of Net 
National  Product,  Ten Advanced  Nonoil  Developing  Countries,  1974 
Billions  of dollars,  except  where  noted 
Gap  (deficit  on goods and 
services  other  than  net  Net national  Ratio, gap to net 
interest  and  dividends  paid)  product  national  product 
Country  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Argentina  -0.441  50.449  -0.01 
Brazil  6.278  88.53&  0.07 
Chile  0.233  7.81th  0.03 
Colombia  0.210  10.18  0.02 
Mexico  1.860  58.59a  0.03 
Peru  0.601  10.90  0.06 
Philippines  0.429  13.23  0.03 
South Korea  2.006  15.14  0.13 
Taiwan  1.123  12.81  0.09 
Thailand  0.283  12.38  0.02 
Sources: Column 1-IMF,  Balance of Paymients Yearbook,  1967-74,  vol. 27 (IMF,  1976), converted 
from SDRs  to dollars; column 2-IMF,  Izternational Financial Statistics, vol. 30 (September 1977), con- 
verted to  dollars, for all countries but Chile, for which the source is  World  Bank Atlas: Population,  Per 
Capita  Product, and Growth  Rates (1976), p. 19. 
a.  Net national product is assumed to equal 0.9 times gross domestic product. 
ments  increased.  On the other  hand,  the 1976 deficits  may  be abnormally 
low as the result  of import  restrictions  and  rates  of growth  that,  for most 
countries,  had  not yet returned  to the rates  of 1970-73. For  these  reasons, 
it seems sensible  to use the ratio of the gap to net product  in 1974 as 
more  or less normal. 
Table 9 applies  the debt-income  model presented  earlier  but in nomi- 
nal  prices.  The  gaps  of table  8 are  divided  by estimates  of r -  i, to offer,  in 
column  3, a measure,  country  by country,  of the limit  of the debt-income 
ratio.  For an estimate  of r, I add a world-inflation  factor of 7 percent  to 
the real growth  rates of 1970-73, which are assumed  to represent  long- 
term  rates.  I assume  an interest  rate,  i, of 8 percent  even  though,  as noted 
earlier,  outstanding  debt-a  mix of loans  from  official  and  private  sources 
-carried  an  interest  rate  in 1975 between  5.5 and  8.4 percent. 
Comparison  of column  3 with  table  5 reveals  that  in 1975 all ten coun- 
tries were substantially  below their debt-income  limit. But that observa- 
tion may have little significance  if the limit of the debt-income  ratio  is so 
high that it would involve an intolerable  interest  burden  on the country. 
Column  5 therefore  shows the ratio of debt to exports  of goods and 
services  at the limit on the assumption  that  the ratio of exports  to net na- 
tional product  remains  what it was in 1974 (column 4). And column  6 Robert Solomon  495 
Table  9. Debt-Incomne  Limits  and  Interest  Burdens,  Ten Advanced  Nonoil 
Developing  Countries,  1974 
Ratio 
Nominal 
growth  Gap to net  Exports  to  Debt to  Interest 
rate  minus  national  Debt-to-  net national  exports  to exports 
interest  product  income  limit  product  at limit  at limit 
Country  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Argentina  0.03  -0.01  -0.33  0.10  ... 
Brazil  0.10  0.07  0.70  0.11  6.36  0.51 
Chile  0.002  0.03  15.00  0.28  53.57  4.29 
Colombia  0.06  0.02  0.33  0.19  1.74  0.14 
Mexico  0.05  0.03  0.60  0.11  5.45  0.44 
Peru  0.05  0.06  1.20  0.17  7.06  0.56 
Philippines  0.06  0.03  0.50  0.27  1.85  0.15 
South Korea  0.10  0.13  1.30  0.35  3.71  0.30 
Taiwan  0.11  0.09  0.82  0.51  1.61  0.13 
Thailand  0.07  0.02  0.29  0.26  1.12  0.09 
Sources: Column 1-real  growtlh  rate in 1970-73 from table 6 above (divided by 100) plus 0.07 (a measure 
of world inflation) minus 0.08 (nomninal  rate of  interest on  debt); column  2-from  column  3,  table 8, 
above; colu-mn  3-column  2  .  column 1; column 4-exports  of goods and services in  1974 from IMF, 
International  Financial Statistics, vol. 29 (August 1976), net national product from table 8 above; column 
5-column  3  +  column 4; colunmn  6-column  5 X 0.08. 
presents  the ratio of interest  payments  to exports  of goods and services 
that would prevail at the limit, still assuming  an 8 percent  nominal  in- 
terest  rate. 
Several  anomalies  are evident  in the table.  Argentina  was in surplus  in 
1974 on current  account.  Over the ten years 1967-76, Argentina's  bal- 
ance  of payments  fluctuated  between  surplus  and  deficit;  on average  there 
was  a current-account  deficit  of about  $75 million.  Even  that  figure  would 
yield a surplus  on goods and services  less interest  and dividends.  Thus  it 
is difficult  to come up with a gap between  investment  and saving  for Ar- 
gentina.  In any event,  the ratios  of debt to GNP and to exports  are rela- 
tively low; in 1976 and the first half of 1977, reserves  increased  sub- 
stantially.  Argentina,  then, can be left aside in considering  whether  the 
group  of ten countries  is headed  for difficulties  because  of overborrowing. 
In the case of Chile, an extremely  low growth  rate in 1970-73  (1.2 
percent  per  year) produced  a very  high  and  unrealistic  limit  of debt  to in- 
come. Assuming  the growth  rate of the 1960s (4.9 percent), and using 
the other  ratios  shown  in table  9, the last column  would  come out at 0.22, 
a not  intolerable  interest  burden. 
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table 5 shows,  but partly  because  of low levels of exports  and GNP. Real 
GDP fell 13 percent  in 1975. Copper  exports,  which constitute  a varying 
but high  proportion  of total exports,  fell 8 percent  in volume  and  40 per- 
cent in price in 1975. In addition,  the "chronic  limitations  on the eco- 
nomic  system  were  aggravated  during  1971-73 as the result  of the drastic 
reorientation  in economic  policy and the reorganization  of the country's 
productive  structure,  which have caused serious difficulties  in recent 
years for the restoration  of the economy's  internal and external  equi- 
librium. "13 
If, in the other  countries,  debt  were to rise to its maximum  ratio  to in- 
come, the interest  burden  would be high, as a proportion  of export  pro- 
ceeds, in the cases of Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and possibly South Korea. 
The remaining  countries-Colombia, the Philippines,  Taiwan,  and Thai- 
land-would,  at the debt  limit,  have annual  interest  payments  equal  to 15 
percent  or less of their  exports  of goods  and  services. 
In 1975, Brazil's  ratio of public debt to GNP was 0.12, as shown in 
table 5. In 1976, the ratio of total debt-amounting to $26 billion-to 
GNP was about  0.20.14  Applying  the interest  rates  estimated  by the World 
Bank  for 1975 to the distribution  of this debt  between  official  and  private 
creditors  yields  total  interest  payments  in 1976 of $1.9 billion.  This  comes 
to 17 percent  of Brazil's  exports  of goods  and  services  in 1976. 
It appears  that Brazil does not have unlimited  leeway for further  in- 
creases  in external  debt relative to its exports. On the other hand, in a 
growing  world  economy,  that country  has considerable  scope to increase 
its  debt  without  raising  the  ratio  of interest  payments  to exports. 
If Brazil's  real GNP were to expand  9 percent  per year in the future 
(compared  with 11 percent  in 1970-73); if its exports  keep up with the 
growth  of its GNP (in the years 1971-75, Brazil's  exports  in real terms 
rose faster  than its real GDP); and if world prices continue  to rise at 7 
percent  per year,  Brazil's  debt could increase  more  than $4 billion a year 
in the next few years  without  raising  the ratio of debt to GNP or to ex- 
ports. A higher  rate of growth  of GNP and exports  would permit  larger 
annual  increases  in debt  without  raising  the debt  burden. 
How fast would the debt-income  ratio creep  up if Brazil  continued  to 
maintain  a gap equal to 7 percent  of its net national  product,  as is as- 
13. Inter-American  Development Bank, Economic and Social Progress in Latin 
America: 1976 Report, p. 186. 
14. From data supplied  by the World Bank. Robert  Solomon  497 
sumed  in table  9? Equation  3 of the model helps  to answer  this question. 
After twenty  years  of debt-financed  growth,  the ratio  increases  by 0.01 a 
year;  after  thirty  years,  by 0.003. By now, therefore,  the ratio  is likely to 
rise  rather  slowly.  Still,  the ultimate  limit  is too high. 
Plainly,  Brazil  cannot  go on indefinitely  with a gap as large  as that as- 
sumed  in table 9. In fact, the gap has decreased  since 1974, both abso- 
lutely and in relation  to GNP. Brazil  grew  at a real rate  of 8.8 percent  i 
1976,15  while the gap was about 4 percent of net national  product.  A 
gradual  narrowing  of the gap, relative  to GNP, should  be possible  with- 
out interfering  with a rapid rate of growth. What it requires  is an in- 
crease  in the saving  rate,  public  or private.  Given  the rapid  growth  of real 
per capita  income  in recent  years (6.3 percent  a year  in 1965-74), Brazil 
should  be able  to adopt  policies  to accomplish  this  increase. 
For Mexico,  too, the ultimate  ratio  of debt  to income  appears  too high, 
though  not as high  as that  of Brazil.  Mexico's  total  debt  at the end of 1976 
was about $20 billion. If its growth  rate returns  to 6 percent  and world 
inflation  continues  at 7 percent,  Mexico's  debt could rise by $2.6 billion 
a year without  increasing  the ratio. In any event, the discovery  of large 
oil reserves  bodes well for Mexico's exports.  Mexlco is unlikely to be- 
come  a problem  case. 
Peru's export  difficulties  have already  been alluded  to. It is a "prob- 
lem" country and negotiations,  with the International  Monetary  Fund 
and  with  private  creditors,  are  currently  under  way. 
South  Korea  is the only other  country  among  the ten with a high  limit 
of debt to income and, at the limit, a relatively  high  ratio  of interest  pay- 
ments to exports. Korea is now far from those limits. Total debt at 
the end of 1976 is estimated  by the World  Bank at $7.5 billion, which 
amounts  to 30 percent  of Korea's  net national  product.  Equation  3 indi- 
cates that, after  ten years  of debt-financed  growth,  the debt-income  ratio 
rises  by 0.05 a year;  after  twenty  years  by less than  0.02. 
With  the same  method  as for Brazil,  Korea's  interest  payments  in 1976 
may be estimated  at $473 million,  which amounted  to only 5 percent  of 
its exports  of goods and services  in that  year. South  Korea  thus will have 
ample  time before  it must  narrow  the gap because  the interest  burden  of 
debt  has  become  oppressive. 
Thus  from  the viewpoint  of the growth-cum-debt  process,  the countries 
considered  here fall into three categories: (1)  those that can go on in- 
15. Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: 1976 Report, p. 175. 498  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
definitely  borrowing  abroad to  finance an excess of investment  over 
domestic  saving;  (2) those  that  may  have  to curtail  their  borrowing  some- 
what  but appear  to be in a position  to do that  without  too much  sacrifice 
of domestic  consumption;  and (3)  two mineral-exporting  countries  that 
have been strongly  affected  by the recession  and slow recovery  in the in- 
dustrial  nations.  These two countries  account  for only 7.5 percent  of the 
total  debt  of the ten countries. 
In general,  therefore,  the performance  and  prospects  of the major  bor- 
rowers  permit  an optimistic  judgment  about  their  creditworthiness. 
What  Could  Go Wrong? 
One of the dangers  often cited by those who are concerned  about  the 
heavy  buildup  of debt  by developing  countries  since 1973 is that the bor- 
rowers  may  be using  the external  resources  to finance  consumption  rather 
than  investment.  Table 10 presents  data  for the ten countries  on the ratio 
of gross  fixed  capital  formation  to gross  domestic  availabilities-domestic 
product  plus net imports  of goods and services.','  Except  those  for Brazil, 
the data are in current  prices and a question  arises about what results 
would  be shown  by deflated  accounts.  Nevertheless,  it is striking  that  only 
two of the countries,  Chile  and Colombia,  exhibit  a decline  in the ratio  of 
gross  fixed investment  to available  resources  after 1973, and in the case 
of Colombia  the decline was slight. From this evidence,  no basis exists 
for the fears that heavy borrowers  among developing  countries  are not 
maintaining  their  rates  of investment. 
Another  concern  relates  to the ability  of the debtor  countries  to export 
in the future.  The analysis  of the growth  process  here  has focused  only on 
the investment-saving  gap. The so-called  foreign-exchange  gap, or trade 
limit,'7  was ignored.  In other words, it was assumed  implicitly  that this 
16. What this amounts to is a measure of I as a percentage  of C + I +  G, where 
I is gross domestic investment, C is private consumption, and G is government  con- 
sumption. If I were measured as a proportion of  Y (gross domestic product), the 
ratio would not go down if a large increase in consumption were matched by in- 
creased imports, since  Y = C + I + G + X -  M, where X  is exports, and M  im- 
ports, of  goods and services. Adding M -  X  to  Y and dividing it into I yields a 
measure  of I divided by (C + I + G). 
17. Hollis B. Chenery and Alan M. Strout, "Foreign Assistance and Economic 
Development,"  American Economic Review, vol.  56  (September 1966), pp. 679- 
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Table 10. Gross  Fixed Capital  Formation  as a Percentage  of Total Absorption, 
Ten Advanced  Nonoil Developing  Countries,  1970-76& 
Country  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976 
Argentina  20.0  19.2  20.1  19.9  20.2  20.8  n.a. 
Brazilb  n.a.  20.7  22.6  24.2  27.6  28.4  n.a. 
Chile  13.8  12.9  11.5  13.1  13.9  11.7  n.a. 
Colombia  20.0  20.0  18.4  17.7  19.1  18.2  n.a. 
Mexico  19.1  17.8  19.4  20.7  21.6  22.6  n.a. 
Peru  13.4  14.7  14.1  15.1  17.3  17.6  16.6 
Philippines  15.7  16.2  15.6  15.8  17.9  22.3  22.9 
South Korea  22.6  20.9  19.1  22.9  23.3  23.5  22.6 
Taiwan  21.8  23.5  26.0  27.7  26.7  29.2  30.4 
Thailand  22.8  21.7  21.4  21.0  22.2  22.2  22.3 
Sources: Except for Brazil, computed from IMF, International  Financial Statistics, vol. 30 (September 
1977), country pages; for  Brazil, Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and Social Progress in 
Latin America: 1976 Report, p. 397. 
a.  Total absorption =  GDP  -  exports +  imports of goods and services =  consumption +  gross fixed 
investment +  increase in stocks +  government consumption. 
b. Computed from data expressed in 1973 prices. 
n.a.  Not available. 
group  of advanced  developing  countries  could  expand  its exports,  if neces- 
sary,  to compensate  for a reduction  in net capital  inflow.  This in turn  re- 
quires  that  the industrial  countries  keep their  markets  open to the exports 
-particularly  exports of manufactures-of  the developing countries. 
Quite apart  from the usual arguments  against  import  restrictions,  in this 
case they would create a transfer  problem  for developing  countries  and 
force  them  to rely  more  on external  borrowing. 
Another  recession  in the industrial  nations  would  be a problem  for the 
debtor  countries.  As in 1975, their exports  would decline and their  cur- 
rent-account  deficits  would  swell.  Unless  they  too fell into recession,  their 
borrowing  needs  would  increase.  One can only hope that  banks  would  act 
rationally  and exhibit  even greater  willingness  to extend  maturities  or in 
other  ways  refinance  debt  while  meeting  the additional  borrowing  require- 
ments.  From  past experience,  banks  have every  reason  to act sympathet- 
ically.  Their  loss experience  on foreign  loans  in recent  years  has  been only 
one-fifth  of their  chargeoffs  on domestic  loans.'8 
There  is no concrete  evidence  that lenders  perceive  increasing  risk on 
international  loans to developing  countries.  For example,  two Eurobond 
issues by the government  of Brazil with similar  terms  in other respects 
sold to yield 10.00 percent  in May 1976 and 8.92 percent  in July 1977. 
18. Robert R. Davies, 'Tests Show Banks are Rational, Efficient  in Granting  LDC 
Credit,"  Bond Buyer, Money Manager,  vol. 6, no. 30 (August 1, 1977), pp. 9-10. 500  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1977 
Over  this same  interval  the average  yield on long-term  international  bond 
issues of governments  fell from 9.31 percent  to 8.36 percent.'9  Even if 
the  perception  of risk  has changed,  the question  of concern  is whether  the 
change  will be reflected  in a reduced  willingness  to lend to developing 
countries.20 
Finally,  it can  be predicted  with a fair  degree  of confidence  that  even  if 
external  conditions  do not create  problems  for developing  countries,  some 
of them  will encounter  balance-of-payments  problems  of their  own mak- 
ing. Economic  policy formulation  has been less than  fully successful  even 
in the industrial  countries  in recent years. In the developing  countries 
policy mistakes,  if not earthquakes,  droughts,  blights,  and other natural 
disasters,  can  be expected  to occur  from  time  to time  and  the consequences 
will have to be dealt with. These consequences  could involve  public  and 
formal  debt renegotiations,  as in the case of Zaire  recently.  Such  isolated 
instances  do not invalidate  the major  thrust  of this paper-that  the ad- 
vanced  developing  countries  look to be good credit  risks  worthy  of a con- 
tinued  flow of new loans as well as refinancing  of maturing  loans. 
It is also a fair judgment  that, while other  developments  in the world 
economy  could make  it more  difficult  for the advanced  developing  coun- 
tries to service  their debts, the generation  of debt in itself is unlikely  to 
cause serious general problems  for the world economy or its financial 
system. 
One justification  for the establishment  of a new supplementary  facility 
in the IMF is that  it will calm  the disquietude  of bankers  who may  worry 
about the several contingencies  discussed  here. In fact, the IMF could 
handle a very large proportion  of the intermediation  between countries 
in surplus  and countries  in deficit  that  is now being  carried  by the banks. 
The fund has the legal authority  to borrow  not only from governments 
but also in financial  markets.  Thus it could absorb  funds from OPEC 
countries  and  from other  surplus  countries  and  pass them  on to countries 
in deficit.  In other  words,  should  the private  market  falter  in performing 
19. Morgan Guaranty  Trust Company of New York, World Financial Markets, 
various issues. 
20. A bit of anecdotal evidence seems pertinent. During the annual meeting of 
the International  Monetary Fund and World Bank in late September 1977, I had a 
conversation  with the minister  of finance  and the governor of the central bank of one 
of the ten countries. They told me that because the country's  reserves  had increased 
sharply over the past year, they had visited banks in New York seeking to repay 
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the intermediation  function-either by reducing  its lending  or by exacting 
excessive  rates  of interest-there is both a rationale  and a means  for the 
substitution  of official  action.  Meanwhile,  even if lending  by the IMF fa- 
cility does not mount, the very fact that it exists should strengthen  the 
confidence  of private  lenders  and encourage  them to keep the financing 
process  going. 
Concluding  Observations 
The question  to which  this  paper  is addressed  may  soon be a nonprob- 
lem; that is, new borrowing  from banks  could drop off sharply  from the 
levels of the past three  years.  If the industrial  countries  resume  a healthy 
rate of expansion,  the current-account  deficits of developing  countries 
could  fall further  in 1977. As table  3 shows,  in 1976 four  of the ten coun- 
tries considered  here were in current  surplus,  and the deficits  of all but 
one of the others  fell. 
It seems appropriate  to conclude  this paper  on the theme  with which 
it began-the  OPEC surplus.  Although much of the analysis  has been 
concerned  with the demand  for international  debt by developing  coun- 
tries,  there  is also a supply  of international  claims  emanating  from  OPEC 
and  other  surplus  countries. 
By almost  perfect  analogy  with the Keynesian  saving-investment  pro- 
cess in a closed economy,  one can argue  that ex ante deficits  on current 
account  must  equal  ex ante  surpluses  if a high  level of world  income  is to 
be maintained.  As long as members  of OPEC, West Germany,  and Ja- 
pan are unable  to reduce  their ex ante surpluses,  either other countries 
must  incur  current-account  deficits  or world  income  will fall until ex post 
surpluses  and  deficits  are  equated. 
Today, no world body functions  analogously  to the makers  of fiscal 
and monetary  policy within  individual  countries.  In time,  that  may come. 
Meanwhile,  balance-of-payments  deficits  and the resultant  debt creation 
should  be viewed  in macroeconomic  terms.  The lessons  of the 1930s have 
been learned, albeit imperfectly,  regarding  domestic  policies. It is not 
evident  that  the lessons  for international  policies  have  yet been  adequately 
appreciated. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Alan Greenspan:  Solomon  has carried  us through  a fairly  general  analysis 
of the debt burden  of the less developed  countries,  and, as far as it goes, 
the case he makes  is credible.  There  is nothing  inevitably  disastrous  about 
the state of debt now owed by the LDCs taken as a whole. There is a 
probability,  perhaps  a significant  one, that  ten  years  from  now  we will  look 
back at the current  period and conclude  that our concerns  about LDC 
debt were misplaced,  in the same sense that our concerns  over a dollar 
shortage  in the early  postwar  period,  and  our fears  that  the Eurocurrency 
market  would become unhinged  several  years ago, were misplaced.  In 
fact, the current  problem  in the debt and balance-of-payments  position 
of the string  of countries  across  Southern  Europe  may well be more seri- 
ous than  the problem  of LDC  debt. 
Nonetheless,  while I concur  with Solomon's  general  conclusion,  I do 
so with  considerably  more  reservations  than  he expresses. 
Solomon's  major  concern  is, apparently,  that his optimistic  appraisal 
is not shared  by the decisionmakers  in the private  financial  markets  and 
that the commercial  and investment  banking  houses  will not be as forth- 
coming  in financing  LDC current-account  deficits  as they have been in 
recent  years. I suspect  that Solomon  is right.  In their public statements 
the international  banking  houses follow a line not terribly  dissimilar  to 
Solomon's,  but their  recent  lending  policies-as,  in fact, Solomon  points 
out-raise  some question about the depth of their convictions. Their 
fears, as best I can judge, are not simply  that it is just a matter  of time 
before they run into a string of defaults and their infelicitous conse- 
quences.  Rather,  their  caution  reflects  a broad  uncertainty  about  the out- 
look, which the state of current  financial  evaluation  is not sufficiently 
sophisticated  to penetrate.  There  is a sense  throughout  the financial  com- 
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munity  that the tools of evaluation  are inadequate  to the problem  they 
confront,  and the hesitancy  on the part  of the bankers  is more a state of 
uncertainty  than  of negative  conviction. 
What the bankers  would obviously like is not a series of historical 
ratios,  but a forecast  of the future.  In this respect,  it is fairly  evident  why 
the standard  measures  of evaluating  the debt problems,  such as the ratio 
to GNP or the so-called  debt-service  ratio, have limited  usefulness.  The 
application  of Solomon's  model  to this problem  is not clear  to me. It does 
not set any useful standards.  It is a static structure  in a very dynamic 
situation. 
To a large  extent,  Solomon's  optimism  rests on a continuation  of past 
trends.  Certainly,  export  growth  and gains in real GNP are critical  ele- 
ments  in his outlook,  and  he cites an impressive  history  in this  regard.  But 
how easy is it to project  these benign  trends?  What  does one make, for 
example, of the potential  for Brazil's  export growth,  when partly as a 
consequence  of the sharp decline in prices, coffee exports in August 
amounted  to only $38 million,  compared  with a monthly  average  of more 
than $300 million during  the first  half of the year?  With coffee futures 
selling  at significant  discounts  from  spot, export  proceeds  cannot  improve 
measurably  over the next year for this very important  LDC commodity. 
Similarly,  Solomon  ends his discussion  of Peru  with  data through  the end 
of 1976, when the outlook appeared  to be improving  considerably.  But 
the situation  has apparently  deteriorated  in recent months  for political 
and  military  reasons. 
While I believe that the record  is, at least, not inconsistent  with the 
view that LDC external  debt on balance  has been financing  investment 
rather  than consumption,  there  is disturbing  evidence  that  in some LDCs 
weapons may become a larger  segment  of budgets.  Hence, the general 
presumption  of a fixed  incremental  capital-output  ratio  is questionable  if 
military  outlays are included  with capital.  Finally, there is the concern 
that the developed  countries  are slowing  their  rate  of growth  and this, in 
turn,  will  lower  the export  potential  of the  LDCs. 
If the international  bankers  are somewhat  cautious  in their optimism 
about the LDC debt problem,  then, their caution  is scarcely  irrational. 
Certainly,  they are not as relaxed  as is Solomon  about  the rollover  prob- 
lem. 
Solomon rejects  the debt-service  ratio because it is not a measure  of 
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that  is precisely  what  that  measure  is attempting  to pick  up. Granted,  it is 
a limited  measure  for a certain  problem.  But whatever  may  be said about 
the general  applicability  of the debt-service  ratio  is also extendable  to the 
debt-GNP  ratio, which bypasses  the problem  of the structure  of matu- 
rities.  In fact, we may  dismiss  the maturity  problem  much  too readily  be- 
cause  we tend  to think  of long- and short-term  debt  availability  as largely 
interchangeable. 
When lenders choose to make a loan, obviously  their conditions  are 
significantly  more  stringent  for a long-term  loan  than  for a short-term  one. 
Moreover,  to the extent that interest  rates tend to be somewhat  lower 
on short-term  borrowing  than on long-term  borrowing,  a lower interest 
burden,  if it is caused by a heavy bunching  of short-term  maturities,  is 
scarcely  a position  financially  superior  to one characterized  by higher  in- 
terest  rates  caused  by advantageously  staggered  long-term  debt.  Similarly, 
while  short-term  debt  is usually  rolled  over,  this  doesn't  happen-at least, 
it doesn't happen voluntarily-unless the borrower  is in good financial 
shape.  But  if the purpose  of this  analysis  is to judge  the creditworthiness  of 
borrowers,  we have  to assume  that  all short-term  debt  will  be called  at ma- 
turity.  To assume  otherwise  begs the question  of financial  soundness.  In 
the short run, repayment  difficulties  owing to a bunching  of short-term 
maturities  are as great  a problem  as heavy  interest  charges  on long-term 
debt. In both instances,  the problem  is one of cash flow, a shortage  of 
foreign  exchange. 
Obviously,  when appraising  the longer-term  stability  of an economy, 
the aggregate  level of debt and the debt capacity  of a country  are clearly 
the more  relevant  considerations. 
But short-term  debt  is not interchangeable,  dollar  for dollar,  with  long- 
term  debt.  A dollar  of short-term  debt capacity  is worth  less than  a dollar 
of long-term  debt capacity.  Since lenders'  terms are more stringent  for 
long-term  than for short-term  debt, for any borrower  the capacity to 
raise short-term  debt must  be larger  than the long-term  one. Hence, any 
general  measure  of debt  burden  must  distinguish  between  short-  and  long- 
term debt, since any measure  of aggregate  debt outstanding  relative  to 
debt-raising  capacity  must  recognize  that short-term  debt capacity  is not 
convertible  dollar  for dollar  into  long-term  debt  capacity. 
Thus, on a maturity-equivalent  basis, funding  short-term  liabilities  is 
the equivalent  of an increase  in debt, rather  than  a mere  exchange. 
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expansion  of IMF activity  as a fallback  for LDC borrowing.  The IMF's 
resources  are limited  by the willingness  of hard-currency  members  (in- 
cluding OPEC members) to contribute  or guarantee,  and here I have 
doubts about how forthcoming  the United States and others will be. I 
doubt, for example,  that the U.S. Congress,  in balancing  funds for do- 
mestic  and  foreign  programs,  is likely  to be generous  in expanding  its con- 
tributions  to the IMF. Moreover,  it is likely to balk at the partial  U.S. 
government  guarantees  implicit  in expanded  IMF borrowings.  Accord- 
ingly,  there  are significant  political  constraints  on the type of LDC fund- 
ing  that  I believe  Solomon  has  in mind. 
John H. Kareken:  Reading  Solomon's  paper,  I was reminded  of a story 
Paul Samuelson  once told. When  it was I don't  remember,  but the aver- 
age of equity  prices  had just decreased  sharply,  sufficiently  to make  Paul 
wonder  whether  private  spending  plans might  be altered.  So he did the 
obvious.  He asked  Mr. Wealth  Effect,  Franco  Modigliani,  whether  he was 
worried.  And Franco  replied  with a reassuring  "no."  Then Paul realized 
that there  was something  else he had to find  out. Did Franco  ever  worry 
about  anything?  And, of course,  Franco  again  replied  "no." 
All that is by way of saying  that Solomon  hasn't  told us all we should 
know.  He isn't  worried  about  the recent  increase  in private  bank  loans to 
LDCs.  But does he, like Franco,  always  walk  the sunny  side of the street? 
I am, however,  being  unfair.  For one thing,  Solomon  has made  a case 
that the borrowing  LDCs are, with high probability,  going to manage- 
perhaps  very  nicely,  thank  you. He has put us in his debt  by putting  LDC 
debt  in perspective,  and,  more  particularly,  by pointing  out how much  of 
total bank  debt is owed by two countries,  Mexico and  Brazil.  If estimates 
of recent oil discoveries  in Mexico are anything  like accurate,  it should 
get by. And what to say of Brazil?  That a well-armed  authoritarian  re- 
gime  is maybe  a better  credit  risk  than  a democracy? 
I am myself a little less sanguine  than Solomon  is, possibly  because  I 
see our economic  future  differently,  or because  I am too gullible  a reader 
of the Wall Street Journal and The Economist, which recently carried ar- 
ticles on the loans banks  have made to Turkey  and Peru.  And I wish he 
had  been able  to tell us how important  the LDC  loans are  in the portfolios 
of the lending  banks.  Are they  as important  as REIT loans  were?  It would 
be helpful  to know  how exposed  banks  are.  What  little I have discovered 
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paper that at the end of 1976 Citibank  had LDC loans amounting  to 
about 6 percent  of its total assets. And we know it had capital,  as con- 
ventionally  measured,  amounting  to 5 percent  of its assets.  That  suggests, 
at least to me, that there  may be some slight  danger,  particularly  if Citi- 
bank is not all that untypical.  The Federal Reserve, which along with 
other  central  banks  can make good loans out of bad, may in certain  cir- 
cumstances  be tempted  to do just that. There is the risk, if banks  have 
more than trivial  exposure,  that the Federal  Reserve  will adopt a more 
inflationary  policy  than  it otherwise  would. 
But the threat,  as Solomon  sees it, is not that  the LDCs  are  going  to de- 
fault  on their  bank  loans. It is rather  that  lenders,  private  and  official,  will 
become  too concerned.  He is worried  only that others  may get worried. 
According  to Solomon,  we (economists,  that is, and responsible  govern- 
ment  officials)  have  leamed  well enough,  or nearly  so, what  the 1930s  had 
to teach us about  the conduct  of domestic  economic  policy, but nothing 
like well enough  what  those tragic  years  could teach  us about  what  inter- 
national  economic  policy  should  be. 
And what  is it that  we should  have distilled  from  the experience  of the 
1930s? Evidently,  that if some governments  desire  current-account  sur- 
pluses, then others must be "allowed"  to run current-account  deficits. 
Financing  for those deficits  must  be assured.  If it is not available,  and in 
consequence  the would-be  deficit  countries  have  to adjust,  then  inevitably 
world  demand,  and  therefore  world  income,  will  decrease. 
That, however,  is far from obvious. Imagine  that private  banks have 
decided  to lend no more  to the LDCs, and  that  for one reason  or another 
official  lenders  do not step in. Then LDC import  demand  decreases.  But 
world  demand  does not necessarily  decrease.  It is enough  to ask whether 
the banks  have  found  other  clients.  The point  is that  an exogenous  change 
in bank asset preference,  an exogenous  change  of the relevant  sort, does 
not necessarily  result  in a decrease  in aggregate  demand.  It may.  But then 
again  it may  not. 
I said "an exogenous  change of the relevant  sort." Of course, if the 
change  is an increase  in money  demand,  then aggregate  demand  does de- 
crease.  But Solomon's  concem is not that private  banks  are going  to stop 
lending  to LDCs  because  they  want  to hold  more  cash. 
So Solomon  can relax.  In his judgment,  there  are  few if any LDCs out 
there  about  ready  to default  on their  bank  loans. Thus,  there  is little dan- 
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private banks, will adopt more expansionary  policies. And as I have 
argued,  the presumption  must  be that there  is no danger  of a decrease  in 
world  demand-a decrease  caused,  that  is, by private  banks  changing  the 
pattern  of their  lending.  Nor is it then of any consequence  whether  that 
new $10 billion IMF credit  facility  is approved  by participating  govern- 
ments. 
Unless of course Solomon is worried,  not about the future  course of 
the world economy,  but about  the fate of "middle-income"  LDCs, those 
countries  that, being relatively  well off, have been able to borrow  from 
private  banks.  But that  is not the concern  Solomon  expressed  in his paper. 
I should  like now to comment  briefly  on what our private  banks  have 
been doing, and, more specifically,  to argue  that their lending  to LDCs 
should  be, if not prohibited,  then very stringently  regulated,  much  more 
stringently  than  to date  it has  been.  My guess  is that  Solomon,  his concern 
being  what  it is, was not thrilled  when  a while  back  Chairman  Burns  thun- 
dered so about  bank lending  to LDCs. Presumably,  his intent  was to in- 
timidate-to  persuade  banks  to decrease,  or at the very  least not increase 
further,  their  portfolios  of LDC loans.  And he was right,  I believe,  to have 
made the try. If he is to be faulted,  it is for not having  done more. But 
then  maybe  on the sly he has. 
Having lived through  the Franklin  National affair,  we are now even 
clearer  than  we were that all of the deposits  of the larger  U.S. banks  are 
insured,  and  by the Federal  Reserve  System,  not the FDIC. (With  the in- 
troduction  of the so-called  large-denomination  CD, the world  has pretty 
much passed  the FDIC by.) Moreover,  those deposits  are insured  at an 
inappropriate  price, a price that is independent  of risk. And we know 
what in general  providing  insurance  at such a price  does: encourage  risk 
taking,  which  if not checked  by regulation  distorts  resource  allocation. 
So the temptation  is for our banks  to hold riskier  portfolios  than  they 
otherwise  would.  And that  some  have  become  rather  substantial  creditors 
of certain  of the LDCs is further  evidence  that the temptation  has been 
too great-or  better, that bankers  know what is in the best interest  of 
those who own their  banks.  It is further  evidence  that  regulation  has not 
been sufficiently  stringent.  For no one can pretend  that the outstanding 
LDC loans, even the best of them,  are  riskless,  or that  the average  loan is 
less risky  than  the average  bank  asset. 
And that is why, as I said earlier,  Chairman  Burns  was right  to have 
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allocation,  but he should,  and  therefore  had an obligation  at least  to warn 
the banks  that  had  become  substantial  creditors  of LDCs.  He had an obli- 
gation,  that  is, to try to make  bank  regulation  a little more stringent  than 
it had  been. 
Why single out LDC loans? Why indeed?  After all, they are not the 
only risky assets that our banks own. Nor do I have an answer  to that 
question,  other  than  that  it is with  LDC loans that  we are currently  occu- 
pied. (And, as I said before, they seem to be among  the more risky of 
bank  assets.) But I would  not single  out LDC loans. Until our insurance 
scheme  is altered,  or done away with, regulation  should do much more 
than  prohibit  or limit  loans  to the  LDCs. 
Goran  Ohlin:  For the kind of issues Solomon  addresses  in his paper,  ag- 
gregate  analysis-whether global  or national-is  a useful  way  to establish 
the magnitude  of the problem.  We now find, in fact, that the relative 
magnitude  of LDC debt has not changed  substantially  from what it was 
before  oil prices  increased.  That  is reassuring  as far  as it goes. But the real 
problems,  after all, are not ones of trends  or magnitudes,  but rather  of 
the stability  of the relationships  between  creditors  and debtors.  And from 
that point of view, I find  it extremely  difficult  to formulate  any adequate 
or satisfactory  observations  on the  present  situation. 
The LDC debt  situation  has  been appraised  in terms  of historical  credit 
environments.  But today  we are talking  about  the operation  of the inter- 
national  capital  market  under  very  special  circumstances.  As a result,  we 
cannot specify and evaluate  risk without  a great  deal more institutional 
detail. 
The contemporary  international  capital  market  is similar  neither  to the 
1930s nor to the 1960s, when  most lending  to LDCs was official  lending. 
Today, private  banks are operating  in markets  with which they are not 
very  familiar.  They  are  not lending  to governments,  but  to public  agencies. 
And the relationship  between  the management  of that debt and the gov- 
ernment's  balance-of-payments  policy  remains  unclear. 
The 1960s saw numerous  reschedulings  and refinancings.  But those 
were reschedulings  and refinancings  among  governments,  and they arose 
because there was a great deal of politically  motivated  lending.  At that 
time,  it was natural  for debtors  to feel that,  because  of the terms  and  mo- 
tives of these  loans, political  reasons  might  similarly  motivate  some alter- 
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I feel that  this  is advantageous.  But, again,  that  is simply  a personal  judg- 
ment; and I am unhappy  about the need, when contemplating  possible 
difficulties,  to fall back on some inspired  speculation  about how people 
will behave  in certain  situations. 
A few more  points  concerning  these  loans should  be kept  in mind.  The 
risk  of technical  default  must  be distinguished  from  "loss"  risk.  The more 
frequently  noted risk of technical  default  is the risk that countries  will, 
for various balance-of-payments  reasons, declare themselves  unwilling 
or unable  to honor their obligations  as originally  contracted.  There will 
be problems,  delays,  and  rollovers,  but the loss risk  for the loans  involved 
will be minimal.  It is also important  to take  into account  the high  returns 
and earnings  received  by lending banks in the LDC market.  Risk pre- 
miums  and the actual  benefits  derived  from such activities  are obviously 
great  enough  to provide  incentives  to stay  in the LDC market.  Therefore, 
some  problems  with  some  debts  would  not necessarily  be cause  for alarm. 
What  of the risk of chain  reactions?  Will temporary  problems  of large 
countries  such as Brazil or Mexico damage  major  banks or market  psy- 
chology  enough  to produce  serious  consequences  in the rest  of the  market? 
One of the principal  factors  determining  the ability  of countries  to con- 
tinue to honor their debt obligations  is the magnitude  of their reserves 
relative  to their  debts.  And, according  to that  factor,  the situation  is fairly 
reassuring  (with the notable exception  of Peru, where things have not 
turned  out as expected). Thus,  I do not believe  a string  of defaults  in the 
LDCs  is likely. 
Despite these generally  reassuring  feelings, the principal  message I 
would like to deliver  is that the specific  details  of bank loans to various 
LDCs and of bank  portfolios  are more important  in appraising  the risks 
of institutional  collapse  than  are  the aggregate  figures. 
General Discussion 
Pentti Kouri felt that Solomon's  optimistic  conclusions  reflected  his 
concentration  upon the group  of LDCs that  had experienced  particularly 
rapid  growth  in exports.  He cautioned  that  the slowness  of the current  re- 
covery, coupled with the growing  demands  for protection  by domestic 
industries  in the developed  countries,  might  prevent  these countries  from 
sustaining  their export drives.  Kouri also called attention  to the poorer 510  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1977 
LDCs, such as Bangladesh,  and the smaller  developed  countries,  which 
did seem to be in trouble.  The former  experienced  difficulties  because 
they had been simultaneously  affected  by adverse movements  in their 
terms  of trade,  poor weather,  high oil and  fertilizer  prices,  and the reces- 
sion; the latter  faced problems  because  they had sustained  their growth 
during  the recession,  betting  on a speedy world recovery.  Solomon re- 
plied that the very  poor LDCs were  primarily  indebted  to official  institu- 
tions  rather  than  private  banks  and  thus  he had  not dealt  with  them  in the 
paper.  He endorsed  Kouri's  call  for a stronger  world  recovery. 
William  Fellner  observed  that  if LDC debt was a fast-growing  compo- 
nent of private  bank assets, there might  be a limit to the proportion  of 
their  portfolios  the banks  would be willing  to hold in this form. Several 
participants  discussed whether such a shift in bank asset preferences 
would be deflationary  to the world economy.  Marina  Whitman  felt that 
it would be, because  it might  disrupt  financial  markets  and national  de- 
velopment  plans. James  Duesenberry  and George  Perry  agreed,  arguing 
that  if loans financing  LDC deficits  were  restricted,  those  countries  would 
have to take contractionary  measures  that would not be automatically 
offset  by stronger  demands  elsewhere.  On the other  hand,  John  Kareken 
argued  that  a compensating  increase  in bank  loans  would  occur  elsewhere 
in the system,  thus  leaving  global  demand  unaffected. 
Robert Solow observed  that what was particularly  remarkable  about 
Solomon's  Domar-like  model was that everything  depended  upon the re- 
lation  between  nominal  interest  rates  and  nominal  growth  rates.  Given  the 
peculiarities  of the current  global  economy,  with  real interest  rates  at ap- 
proximately  1 percent,  it is not particularly  surprising  that, for countries 
that are growing  at all, the asymptotic  ratios  look good. But would  lend- 
ing continue  indefinitely  at such  a real  rate  of interest? 